Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction of win-win solutions by Muradian, R. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/197230
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-02 and may be subject to
change.
POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction
of win-win solutions
R. Muradian1, M. Arsel2, L. Pellegrini2, F. Adaman3, B. Aguilar4, B. Agarwal5, E. Corbera6, D. Ezzine de Blas7,
J. Farley8, G. Froger9, E. Garcia-Frapolli10, E. Go´mez-Baggethun6,11, J. Gowdy12, N. Kosoy13, J.F. Le Coq7,14,
P. Leroy1, P. May15, P. Me´ral16, P. Mibielli17, R. Norgaard18, B. Ozkaynak3, U. Pascual19,20, W. Pengue21,
M. Perez22, D. Pesche7, R. Pirard23, J. Ramos-Martin6, L. Rival24, F. Saenz15, G. Van Hecken25, A. Vatn26,
B. Vira19, & K. Urama27
1 Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands
2 ISS, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands
3 Bog˘azic¸i University, Turkey
4 Fundacio´n Neotro´pica, Costa Rica
5 University of Manchester, UK
6 Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona, Spain
7 CIRAD, France
8 University of Vermont, USA
9 Universite´ de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France
10 UNAM, Mexico
11 Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid, Spain
12 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA
13 McGill University, Canada
14 Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, Costa Rica
15 Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
16 Institut de Recherche pour le De´veloppement, France
17 Universidade Esta´cio de Sa´, Brazil
18 University of California, Berkeley, USA
19 University of Cambridge, UK
20 Basque Centre for Climate Change & Ikerbasque Foundation for Science, Spain
21 Universidad de General Sarmiento, Argentina
22 Universidad del Valle, Colombia
23 IDDRI, France
24 University of Oxford, UK
25 Universiteit van Antwerpen, Belgium
26 Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway
27 African Technology Policy Studies Network, Kenya
Keywords
Market-based policy tools; payments for
ecosystem services; enviromental governace;
integrated conservation and development
projects; ecosystem services.
Correspondence
Roldan Muradian, Radboud University, P.O. Box
9104. 6500HE Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Tel: +31-2-4361-3058; fax: +31-2-4361-5957.
E-mail: r.muradian@maw.ru.nl
Received
18 July 2012
Accepted
8 November 2012
Editor
Catherine Tucker
Editor in Chief note
This article inspired an alternative viewpoint
presented by S. Wunder on page 230.
doi: 10.1111/j.1755-263X.2012.00309.x
Abstract
In this commentary we critically discuss the suitability of payments for ecosys-
tem services and the most important challenges they face. While such instru-
ments can play a role in improving environmental governance, we argue that
over-reliance on payments as win-win solutions might lead to ineffective out-
comes, similar to earlier experience with integrated conservation and devel-
opment projects. Our objective is to raise awareness, particularly among pol-
icy makers and practitioners, about the limitations of such instruments and
to encourage a dialogue about the policy contexts in which they might be
appropriate.
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Introduction
In an influential paper, Ferraro and Kiss (2002) argued
10 years ago that “direct” payments for biodiversity con-
servation were more effective and efficient than inte-
grated conservation and development projects (ICDPs)
and called for their adoption as policy tools to conserve
ecosystems. Since then, the application of payments for
ecosystem services (PES) has boomed (Pattanayak et al.
2010). The dominant theory for PES is based on the as-
sumption that the undersupply of ecosystem services is
the result of market failures, and therefore valuing and
paying for such services will help to solve these environ-
mental externalities (Engel et al. 2008). It is also argued
that where providers of ecosystem services are poor land-
holders or disadvantaged communities, such payments
can contribute to poverty alleviation (Pagiola et al. 2005).
The possibilities of “win-win” scenarios are part of the
reasons why PES have become so attractive, particularly
among conservation practitioners and policy makers in
developing countries (see e.g., van Wilgen et al. 1998;
Miles and Kapos 2008).
This is not the first time that particular policy tools have
become the dominant form of intervention for biodiver-
sity conservation. Twenty years ago, for instance, after
recognizing the limited success of protected areas for bio-
diversity conservation in developing countries, Wells and
Brandon (1992) argued in favor of what they termed “in-
tegrated conservation and development projects (ICDP).”
Gaining wide acceptance during the first Rio Summit on
Sustainable Development, ICDPs shaped the agenda of
biodiversity conservation in the subsequent decade.
Christensen (2004, p. 7) pointed out that the main rea-
son for their rapid dissemination was that “they offered
something for everyone. They promised to defuse the ma-
jor threats to biodiversity, create better opportunities for
people to earn a decent living and gain access to basic
services, and equitably address the rights and interests
of everyone who uses land and resources in and around
protected areas.” In other words, ICDPs came with the
promise of “win-win” solutions. A decade later, however,
more or less coinciding with the Johannesburg Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development, scholars and practition-
ers acknowledged that success with ICDPs was rather
elusive (Hughes and Flintan 2001). Christensen (2004,
p. 18) noted that the “the myth of win-win solutions cre-
ated a culture in which overly ambitious projects prolif-
erated, based on weak assumptions and little evidence.”
Today, we could be making a similar mistake with
PES. Our aim is not to reject payments for the conserva-
tion of ecosystems altogether, and we acknowledge that
win-win solutions at the interface of conservation and
development are possible, under particular institutional
and governance contexts. Nonetheless, we caution pol-
icy makers and practitioners that an uncritical commit-
ment to such policy tools can lead to unintended out-
comes. PES face significant challenges, and a number of
them remind us of the limitations faced by ICDPs. Later
we summarize what we consider to be the most impor-
tant of these challenges.
There is a heated debate in the current academic liter-
ature about the so-called “market-based” instruments for
environmental policy, a generic term that has been used
to refer to a wide range of tools such as cap-and-trade
permits, certification schemes, biodiversity offsets, PES,
and others. The debate includes discussions about their
nature and typology (Pirard 2012), the conditions under
which they are effective (Lockie 2013) and their social
implications (McAfee 2012). The fortunes and woes of
“market-based” instruments have been contested along
disciplinary and ideological lines. Some see them as a
promising policy option (Kinzig et al. 2011), but for oth-
ers they constitute a good example of the “neoliberal-
ization of nature” (McAfee and Shapiro 2010). Along-
side the growing implementation of PES, voices critical
of this way of managing ecosystem services are increas-
ingly heard. According to some critical scholars, by “try-
ing to sell nature to save it” market-based approaches
reflect the contradictory logic of “green capitalism,” and
neglect to address the ultimate causes of environmen-
tal degradation, namely the dynamics of capital accu-
mulation in the current global economic system (Arsel
and Bu¨scher 2012). Spash (2011) discusses the concep-
tual flaws in neoclassical environmental valuation and
the misleading ways that economic reasoning is used to
justify PES schemes that may be ineffective or even coun-
terproductive in preserving ecological services. Kosoy and
Corbera (2010, p. 1229) argue that PES schemes reflect
a “commodity fetishism” that reduces ecosystem values
to a single exchange-value measure, and obscures the
social relations embodied in “producing” and “selling”
ecosystem services. In the same line, Krall and Gowdy
(2012) and Burkett (2006) criticize the practice of re-
ducing all the functions of nature to exchange value.
Much of this stream of critique is informed by the work
of Polanyi (1944, p. 73) who argued that to “allow the
market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of hu-
man beings and their natural environment, indeed, even
of the amount and use of purchasing power, would re-
sult in the demolition of society.” Acknowledging the var-
ied contributions in this broad debate, our purpose here
is to summarize and systematize what we consider the
most important issues of concern in the particular case of
PES.
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Not all payments are markets
First, we consider that the label “market-based” is not
very appropriate to describe payments for the conser-
vation of ecosystems. Even though PES have been con-
ceptualized either as markets to reflect the scarcity of
such—often unacknowledged—services and to internal-
ize the external costs of ecosystems’ degradation (Engel
et al. 2008) or as instruments of neoliberal conservation
(Bu¨scher 2012), in practice very few existing PES can
be considered as pure markets. A market is a constella-
tion of buyers and sellers involved in transactions. These
exchanges are voluntary and goods or services are ex-
changed against monetary payments or through in-kind
arrangements. The actors may be individuals, firms, pub-
lic bodies, among others. Markets are typically character-
ized by the existence of various types of intermediaries
and they require a high level of commoditization and
conditionality. In other words, the good/service is pro-
vided only if the payment takes place and vice versa.
The debate about PES has been muddled by insuffi-
cient acknowledgment of the difference between incen-
tives and market transactions (Muradian and Rival 2012).
However, in the literature of behavioral economics, there
is abundant evidence about the diversity of behavioral re-
actions to monetary transfers, which often differ from the
predictions of models assuming humans as self-interested
individuals that respond to price signals as maximizers
of economic benefits in the market sphere (Bowles and
Polanı´a-Reyes 2012). Most PES schemes do not fulfill
the strict criteria that define markets (high commoditi-
zation; high conditionality; voluntariness), mainly due
to the inherent complexities of socioecological systems
and significant transaction costs (Muradian et al. 2010).
Besides, the fact that most ecosystem services are ei-
ther public goods or common pool resources by na-
ture makes that their commoditization becomes very
hard in practice (Farley and Costanza 2010). Further-
more, even if ecosystem services could be smoothly in-
tegrated into markets, such process could lead to unac-
ceptable outcomes according to local notions of fairness
(Pascual et al. 2010), which constitutes an important issue
for concern among policy makers and practitioners. As
Bromley (1990) points out, the goal of efficiency is not
an objective criterion for policy judgments, but rather
a value judgment. There is often a mismatch between
the normative stances of market advocates, in which
economic efficiency considerations prevail (Kinzig et al.
2011), and the dilemmas faced by practitioners and pol-
icy makers on the ground, where efficiency is only one
of the many dimensions that need to be considered
(Corbera and Pascual 2012).
Outcomes depend on institutions
PES are expected to be effective in reconciling the inter-
ests of different agents and therefore they are often as-
sumed to be less susceptible to “politicization.” The res-
olution of “market failures” through payments tends to
be seen as a technical matter. In practice, however, as
with any other policy instrument, PES are part of broader
structures of power. Pressure groups might have a large
influence on the design of payment schemes, shaping
their effectiveness and distributional outcomes (Boyce
2002; Corbera et al. 2009). For instance, some studies re-
port that national PES scheme in Costa Rica hold a low
degree of environmental additionality, that is, it targets
areas with low deforestation risk (Sierra and Russman
2006; Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007), and tends to enroll
areas with low opportunity costs, relatively large farms,
and private firms (Porras 2010). This allocation of pay-
ments may be partly explained by the large leverage of
the forestry sector in the scheme’s design (Le Coq et al.
2012). In the mid 1990s, this sector saw the emerging
PES scheme as an opportunity to justify continuing direct
public support to it. This favored the status quo over max-
imizing environmental additionality. Similarly, the pay-
ment program for ecosystem services in Mexico is also
reported to hold a low degree of environmental addition-
ality (Mun˜oz-Pin˜a et al. 2008), again probably reflecting
the high influence of some social groups. This scheme
was closer to the interests of small farmers and indige-
nous communities (McAfee and Shapiro 2010), leading
to greater importance being given to historical steward-
ship (over additionality) in targeting the payments.
The decision to give more weight to either rewarding
good environmental stewardship or favoring previous en-
titlements, instead of to optimizing additionality, is es-
sentially a political one. While not judging here such po-
litically motivated decisions or outcomes, we would like
to stress that: (1) the outcomes of payments depend to
a large extent on the interplay of political forces (Vatn
2010) and (2) PES cannot be considered a priori as the
most cost-effective policy option to achieve environmen-
tal goals or the most likely to deliver development bene-
fits, as argued by some authors (Ferraro and Kiss 2002).
In sum, the design of payments cannot be “depolitized,”
and emphasis should be given to the process of policy de-
sign.
Monetary incentives might crowd out
intrinsic motivations
The effects of payments in inducing behavioral changes
can vary substantially, depending on how the social
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meaning of such payments is constructed. For example,
payments might enhance or crowd out intrinsic moti-
vations to undertake an activity (Frey and Jegen 2001;
Bowles 2008; Charness and Gneezy 2009). The outcomes
will depend on a variety of factors, including the mag-
nitude of the payment, whether it is individual or col-
lective, local notions of fairness, and the psychological,
cultural, and social embeddedness of the concerned be-
havior (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Fehr and Falk
2002). Payments do not always strengthen social and eth-
ical motives, and they may actually undermine such mo-
tives in some situations (Titmuss 1970; Bowles 2008).
The likelihood of this happening is higher when the pro-
moted tasks have an important prosocial component, or
when a sense of altruism or moral consideration guide
people’s actions (including contributions to the common
good). These considerations are important when the con-
text is characterized by strong civic values, social norms
and habits of cooperation (Lacetera and Macis 2010;
Narloch et al. 2012). When monetary transfers for in-
ducing more environmentally friendly land use practices
are applied in these conditions, we risk eroding intrin-
sic motivations and other institutions. Although there
is a large body of evidence showing that intrinsic moti-
vations and local notions of rights can strengthen com-
munity cooperation in governing the commons (Ostrom
1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Agarwal 2010), we
still lack adequate empirical evidence on the particular
mix of monetary and nonmonetary incentives needed
for the effective conservation of ecosystems, particularly
when collective action institutions are involved (Oldekop
et al. in press). A better understanding of these behav-
ioral and governance dimensions is needed, before we
rush to adopt payments as the most appropriate policy
option.
The traps of the compensation logic
The expectation to counteract highly profitable (yet en-
vironmentally damaging) economic activities with pay-
ments (compensation) may create scenarios where the
protection of ecosystems is only possible with increasing
levels of compensation due to the increased opportunity
cost of conservation. Such scenarios are likely to create
unjust and/or very costly outcomes, since the cost of com-
pensation might be considerably higher than the cost of
alternative policies (Gregersen et al. 2010). This issue is
particularly salient in countries where communities or
regulatory agencies are unable to provide the necessary
compensation to powerful market players. During the last
decade, the price of commodities has boomed, increasing
the opportunity cost of conserving valuable ecosystems,
while the price of carbon sequestration and other ecosys-
tem services did not follow a similar trend, and it seems
unlikely that they will experience a significant rise in the
short or mid term (Karsenty et al. in press). In Indone-
sia, for example, palm oil plantations have emerged as
an important driver of deforestation. The potential eco-
nomic benefits of forests allocated to the voluntary car-
bon market are reported to be much lower than the es-
timated benefits from oil palm, shedding doubts about
the competitiveness of the former (Butler et al. 2009).
As long as the price of commodities remains high, it is
unlikely that PES will be able, by themselves, to stop
the current aggressive expansion of the commodity fron-
tiers into natural ecosystems. The conservation of biodi-
versity would require acknowledging trade-offs between
economic efficiency and other considerations, and to rec-
ognize that not all opportunity costs can, or should, be
compensated. Moreover, when the recipient of payments
is considerably wealthier than the local beneficiaries of
ecosystem services, compensation raises important equity
concerns.
Avoiding the same mistakes
The outcomes of PES depend on the political, sociocul-
tural and institutional contexts in which they operate.
Attention has to be paid to understanding under which
conditions PES can make a significant contribution to the
conservation of ecosystems, instead of assuming them
as policy panaceas. Emphasis is also needed on tackling
the ultimate causes of environmental degradation, deeply
rooted in power relations and the way in which capital
is accumulated and wealth is generated through capital-
ist markets, which are imbued with structural power in-
equalities.
During the past two decades we have been lulled into
complacency by the allure of “win-win” solutions and we
have assumed rather too quickly that simple policy tools
(either ICDPs or PES) can solve complex policy prob-
lems. This has distracted the attention of policy makers
and practitioners from core issues, namely, the quality
and effectiveness of rule-making where there are con-
flicting interests, the validity of assumptions underlying
such decisions and how to face trade-offs. We already
know that the track record of using panaceas in envi-
ronmental policy “is one of repeated failures” (Ostrom
et al. 2007) and therefore we need to avoid making the
same mistakes again. Instead, a move to more context-
specific policy framing, where payments constitute but
one among a diverse set of potential solutions, might
prove a more effective way to tackle socioenvironmental
challenges.
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